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## JCS Declassification/Release Instructions on File

ENCLOSURE A

### RECOMMENDED ADDITION TO APPENDIX A, RESUME OF AIR STRIKE PROGRAM AGAINST THE DRV

As discussed in the group meeting 5 November, recommend add the following at end of present Appendix A:

#### Comment

##### 15. Pre-strike Casualty Estimates:

a. Each JCS-numbered target authorized by the National Authorities for inclusion in the ROLLING THUNDER strike program is described to those authorities in detail. The description is in written "Target Data Summaries" (TDS), which include among other things photography and the JCS estimate of expected casualties both military and civilian for each target. Attached as an example is a TDS sheet such as accompanies all ROLLING THUNDER proposals.

b. The casualty estimates thus presented are based upon DIA calculations for the expected weapon delivery accuracies (CEP), for each specific target concerned (including surrounding areas out to a distance of 3 CEP), and for the total weight of attack expected to achieve the JCS specified level of damage. The DIA calculations are for a fully-populated (i.e., fully non-alert) target condition. For the TDS these calculations are further modified to an assumed alert condition estimate by multiplication by 0.1 (a jointly developed DIA-Joint Staff judgment factor).

c. In the case of pre-strike casualty estimates for recorded "re-strikes" three factors must be considered. First, for quite some time attack of fixed targets in small incremental strikes has been authorized, the intention being to build up to the total desired level of damage without mutual interference among many attacking aircraft such as by dust and smoke at the target, etc. In a simple listing of strikes

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each of these increments would appear as a separate event, but it should be recognized that only their cumulative total would be comparable to the total weight of effort reflected in the basic casualty calculations. Next, in second and later increments of such strikes, casualties would often be expected to be less than the share pro-rated by weight of effort, because of target abandonment, etc. Finally, the foregoing target abandonment aspect tends to be offset in certain other restrike events, such as the restrike of Vinh airfield, where personnel activity (in this case the repair of the airfield) was the cause for the restrike.

d. So far as concerns the TDS pre-strike casualty estimates for the National Authorities, no attempt was made to refine those estimates to reflect the foregoing. Thus it appears that the most valid appreciation of the total estimated casualties which the National Authorities accepted in advance, for approved fixed target strikes, is the simple total of TDS casualty estimates.

e. For the targets in the seven DRV towns treated in Appendix C, Part C, these totals are as follows:

	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Ha Tinh	49	54	103
Ben Thuy	2	63	65
Thanh Hoa	137	104	241
Dong Hoi	603	38	641
Vinh	1,213	61	1,274
Nam Dinh	0	39	39
Yen Bai	<u>369</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>371</u>
	<u>2,373</u>	<u>361</u>	<u>2,734</u>

f. For the 125 approved JCS-numbered targets struck through 5 November 1965, pre-attack TDS casualty estimate totals are:

Military:	6,048
Civilian:	<u>639</u>
Total Casualties:	<u>6,687</u>

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The total of seven strikes on Yen Bay July 9-17 include an example of a kind of operational mistake which can occur in war. The only authorized or assigned target in Yen Bay is the Yen Bay ordnance depot, JCS No. 44. This target was struck with small incremental strikes on July 9, 10, 11, 12, and 17, by a total of 34 strike aircraft. A small railroad marshaling yard in the town is not on the JCS numbered target list (reflecting the combination of its location in the town and its small importance). It is not an authorized armed reconnaissance target, because of the rule against strikes in populated areas, and in any case armed reconnaissance in the Yen Bay area had not been authorized as of the time of the Yen Bay strike. Yet it was hit by Thai based aircraft on July 11, 13, and 14. Information of the unauthorized strike of this target was relatively late in arrival at higher headquarters because of the slow relay of pilot debriefs. As soon as it became known to CINCPAC he took steps to prevent further strike of the yard.

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